Abstract: System security involves decisions in at least three areas: identification of well-defined security policies, selection of cost-effective defence strategies, and implementation of real-time defence tactics. Although choices made in each of these areas affect the others, existing decision models typically handle these three decision areas in isolation. There is no comprehensive tool that can integrate them to provide a single efficient model for safeguarding a network. In addition, there is no clear way to determine which particular combinations of defence decisions result in cost-effective solutions. To address these problems, this paper introduces a Layered Decision Model (LDM) for use in deciding how to address defence decisions based on their cost-effectiveness. To validate the LDM and illustrate how it is used, we used simulation to test model rationality and applied the LDM to the design of system security for an e-commercial business case.
Introduction
Since most businesses have moved to network-based environments, the security of their information and computer networks is critical . System security (sometimes called network defence) is a complicated and dynamic process involving many decision types and decision layers. Ideally, a security decision system would support a cohesive security process (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) , which includes at least the following three key decision layers:
• well-defined security policies for regulating how an organisation protects sensitive and critical system resources
• cost-effective defence strategies for making use of different defence techniques
• cost-effective real-time defence tactics for countering immediate threats.
Although there has been a proliferation of individual models developed for risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis for network security decision systems, many treat these three decision areas in isolation. In addition, there is no comprehensive decision system that integrates these areas into a single, efficient model of network safeguards. Therefore, the connectivity between decisions involving security policies, defence strategies, and defence tactics is weak at best. Also, most early system security deployments did not consider the cost-effectiveness of a network defence plan to be an important factor. Yet, the cost to deploy a defence plan, weighted against the benefit (cost-savings) it brings to an organisation, is an important part of risk assessment and management of network protection techniques.
To address these problems, this paper presents a Layered Decision Model (LDM) based on our previous work (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) , which integrates interrelated decisions across three layers in a consistent uniform framework:
• Layer Zero for security policies
• Layer One for defence strategies
• Layer Two for real-time defence tactics.
The LDM was developed by combining risk assessment, business cost modelling, and cost-benefit analysis techniques. We also drew upon innovations in the area of game theory modelling.
By applying the LDM to decision processes, system designers can capture the key features of the network safeguarding decision process and integrate security policies, defence strategies and defence tactics under a single, consistent framework. Within this framework they can then perform integrated cost assessment quantitatively and qualitatively at multiple layers to achieve a balanced security investment.
To test if the model meets its intentions, this paper reports on an investigation of various validation techniques, application of a simulation approach for testing the model rationality, and application of case studies to validate model usability.
The work presented in this paper is intended to provide a good foundation for future work in this area. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes related work; Section 3 explains the LDM concept and architecture; Section 4 discusses model validation; Section 5 presents the simulation system design; Section 6 describes the case study that illustrates how the model works; Section 7 offers a brief comparison between our methodology and other related work; and finally, Section 8 concludes the paper with remarks on future work.
Related work
The LDM presented in this paper includes risk assessment, business cost modelling, and cost-benefit analysis techniques. This section draws upon innovations in these fields, and discusses how they are applied in our model development and validation process.
Risk management models for network security
IT governance strategies and goals are not independent of enterprise strategies and goals. Rather, they are included in enterprise strategies and goals (ITGI, 2003) . The IT Governance Institute (ITGI, 2003) presents an enterprise management guidance for the design of IT governance strategies and goals to meet the requirement of enterprise strategies and goals. Critical goals of both IT governance and enterprise strategies are the maintenance of business continuity and reduction of business loss, as for instance might occur due to a network security failure.
Risk assessment is a critical aspect of IT governance strategies, and many researchers (Campbell and Sands, 1979; Gilbert, 1989; Badenhorst et al., 1993; Jung et al., 2003; Hamdi and Boudriga, 2005; Williams, 2007) have studied models of risk management processes for network security. The basic risk management processes include value analysis, threat analysis and identification, vulnerability analysis, risk analysis, risk assessment, management decision, control implementation, and effectiveness review (Campbell and Sands, 1979) .
To accurately identify threats and assess the vulnerabilities of a network system, an organisation needs to first define comprehensive high-level enterprise business goals and IT governance goals (ITGI, 2003) . These normally include security plans, which specify what resources to protect and how to protect them. For example, for health care providers, critical data include records of birth and death, Social Security Numbers (SSNs), and other Protected Health Information (PHI) of patients as stipulated by law. The US government established the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996, which dictates strict guidelines for protecting data confidentiality and integrity. HIPAA requires all health care providers and their administrative agencies to comply with the HIPAA policies when handling patients' medical records (Williams, 2007) . In previous work (Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) we considered language-based security for a sample state governmental agency which regulates health care providers and manages patients' medical records. Williams (2007) also proposes a similar six-step framework for risk assessment and discusses how to practically implement it for protecting medical data in Australia. Hamdi and Boudriga (2005) discuss several challenging issues in implementing a traditional risk management approach, such as 'real time reactivity'. They indicate that in traditional risk management approaches, the 'real-time reactivity' of network defence systems has not been adequately addressed due to the following reasons:
• traditional firewall technologies and network intrusion systems tried to stop all attacks, but this goal was not achievable, and not cost-effective
• 'real-time reactivity' requires the network defence system to take proper defence tactics or responsive actions in a timely manner.
Some actions can be done quickly (e.g., to block a TCP port); some may take longer and need the approval of high-level management (e.g., to entirely cut off a business partner's access). To improve 'real time reactivity', we propose a method for devising a set of pre-planned cost-effective defence tactics for known attacks, so that the network defence system can more easily invoke proper defence tactics to counter on-going attacks in situations where human guidance is not necessary. The LDM addresses the 'real-time reactivity' issues at Layer Two, which not only defines real-time defence tactics, but also conducts cost-benefit analysis to select the most cost-effective defence tactics to counter specific on-going attacks (Wei et al., 2005; Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) . These basic procedures of the above risk management models are adopted in our LDM risk assessment model component, which not only identify threats, risks and vulnerabilities of the network system, but also closely connects high-level enterprise business goals and security goals with lower-level defence plans, which may then be used to develop cost-effective defence plans to counter identified threats (Wei et al., 2005; Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) .
Cost modelling for business impact analysis
After determining the threats, vulnerabilities and risks through risk assessment, business impact analysis must be conducted. Numerous authors (Campbell and Sands, 1979; Fites and Kratz, 1993; Erbschloe, 2001; Krause and Tipton, 2003) have studied modelling techniques to quantitatively and qualitatively measure business impact. Single Loss Expectancy (SLE), Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) and annual attack frequency can each be used when assessing damage cost or business impact of a threat (Wei et al., 2005) . To estimate business cost, researchers (Campbell and Sands, 1979; Fites and Kratz, 1993; Erbschloe, 2001; Krause and Tipton, 2003) divide the total cost into detailed cost categories and cost items, which can be obtained through questionnaires and interviews with experts (Krause and Tipton, 2003) . Fites and Kratz (1993) also take into consideration the criticality and sensitivity of assets when assigning different values to them. Erbschloe (2001) divides business impact into "immediate impact, short-term impact and long-term impact", and each of these may also have different values.
Cost-benefit analytical models for security investment
While developing and deploying security mechanisms for protecting network security, many researchers and security experts have developed models to study how much overall security investment is enough for an organisation (Soo Hoo, 2000; Butler, 2002; Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Cavusoglu et al., 2004 Cavusoglu et al., , 2005 Paquet and Saxe, 2005; Bistareli et al., 2006; Sklavos and Souras, 2006) , and the cost-effectiveness of specific network defence techniques, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) (Iheagwara et al., 2004; Timm, 2004a, 2004b) . The above research lays a solid foundation work for developing the comprehensive cost model and cost-benefit analysis for the LDM (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) . Paquet and Saxe (2005) investigate network security from the business point of view, and use a sample business case to demonstrate how much security investment is necessary and how to estimate the costs and benefits of specific defence plans, etc. Soo Hoo (2000) creates a quantitative methodology for measuring the costs and benefits of deploying different security measures and takes into consideration uncertainty issues inherent in the risk assessment process. Butler (2002) develops a security attribute evaluation methodology based on a cost-benefit approach and multi-attribute risk assessment. Both researchers conduct sensitivity analyses by changing parameters and combinations of techniques to compare the cost-effectiveness of different defence plans, and select the best one. Researchers (Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Cavusoglu et al., 2004 Cavusoglu et al., , 2005 Bodin et al., 2005; Bistareli et al., 2006; Sklavos and Souras, 2006) have also applied economic models in which they investigate different security investment plans, compare their cost-effectiveness, and select the best plan to optimise the Return-On-Investment (ROI).
In addition, other researchers (Iheagwara et al., 2004; Timm, 2004a, 2004b ) also conduct cost-benefit analysis for deploying IDS, through ROI analysis and sample case studies. Their work promotes the study of cost-benefit analysis for network defence to a more practical stage. However, their research only focuses on IDS techniques without taking into consideration all potential security measures when defending against attacks.
Moreover, game theoretic modelling has been used to investigate network defence (Cohen, 2002; Lye and Wing, 2002; Cavusoglu et al., 2004 ). This approach is used both to simulate network attack/defence processes and maximise security investment.
An ongoing concern for all cost/benefit approaches to date are the uncertainties and variability when estimating parameters, such as annual attack frequency during risk assessment (Conrad, 2005; Locher, 2005) . Conrad and Locher both adopt probabilistic methods to handle these uncertainties and variability when simulating the risk assessment process.
Cost modelling for network IDS for real-time defence
To study real-time network defence (Wei et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2002) develop cost modelling for network IDSs, which can be used to address the 'real-time reactivity' issues raised by Hamdi and Boudrigaet (2005) . Their research follows a risk analysis procedure to select sensitive data assets and create a cost matrix for each intrusion. They divide the cost items into damage costs, operation costs, and response costs, and then combine them to calculate the total cost for each intrusion. Damage cost (i.e., Single Loss Expectancy, SLE -see Section 2.5) represents the "maximum amount of damage to an attack target when the IDS and other protective measures are either unavailable or ineffective." Response cost is the cost of responding to the intrusion which includes taking some action to stop the intrusion and reduce the damage. These actions or countermeasures should be defined during the risk analysis process according to specific threats. Operation cost is the cost of "processing the stream of events being monitored by an IDS and analysing the activities using intrusion detection models". Operation cost and response cost together form the investment cost of a defensive action.
Cost modelling and cost-benefit analysis for LDM
The concepts of these cost modelling and cost-benefit analyses are adopted in developing a comprehensive cost model component for the LDM to assess investment costs of defence plans and their benefits (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) . Our LDM cost model addresses two major expense categories: post-occurrence cost and pre-occurrence cost (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) . 'Post-occurrence' cost is the total expense incurred when recovering from a successful attack. This is also known as Single Loss Expectancy (SLE). SLE multiplied by the expected annual frequency of attacks becomes the ALE. The Post-occurrence cost covers:
• labour expense for inspecting, repairing and restoring the system
• material cost for replacement of hardware, software and facilities
• loss of confidential data and intellectual assets
• downtime pay for idled employees
• lost business opportunity.
'Pre-occurrence cost' is the investment in a defence plan and covers:
• price of defence hardware, software, and facilities
• one-time labour expense for installing and testing the defence system
• ongoing maintenance to install patches, updates, and upgrades
• personnel training.
When assessing the costs and benefits of real-time defence tactics at Layer Two, we drew upon the cost models developed by Wei et al. (2001) and Lee et al. (2002) for IDS, which include: assessing damage costs or post-occurrence costs for attacks, determining response costs and operation costs, and evaluating the benefits of taking specific responsive actions to counter on-going attacks to determine if these attacks are worth countering.
The cost-benefit analysis in the LDM is based on ROI analyses for security investment on network defence technologies (Iheagwara et al., 2004; Timm, 2004a, 2004b; Sonnenreich et al., 2006) . Throughout the literature, there are several definitions of ROI. In this research, we define ROI as the ratio of net cost saving or money not lost from threats compared to the money invested in network defence.
Model validation techniques
When developing the LDM we needed to validate it by showing that it is rational and useful. By 'rational' we mean that the LDM process must be consistent, free of Blocked Execution Paths (BEP), and be able to produce cost-effective defence plans. The term 'useful' means that the model indeed serves its purpose, and can be used to make decisions for cost-effective network defence in real-world business cases. The BEP will occur if the upper-layer objects cannot be matched to lower-layer objects in a decision process, or that lower-layer objects cannot match the requirements of the upper-layer objects, which prevents us from reaching the end points of the decision process.
There are many validation strategies (conceptual model validation, operational validity, etc.) and techniques (cases study, face validity, simulation, hypothesis test, etc.) currently available to validate different model features (Balci, 1994; Carson, 2002; Sargent, 2003) . Rationality is an important feature of the LDM, indeed of any decision-making model used to make real-world decisions. Face validity based on experts' knowledge is one of the most useful techniques for testing model rationality (Balci, 1994; Kim and Fishwick, 1998; Carson, 2002; Sargent, 2003; Ning et al., 2004) . Researchers (Kim and Fishwick, 1998) show that implementing experts' knowledge into computerised simulation systems can automatically and cost-effectively test model rationalities. Other researchers (Cohen, 1999; Schow et al., 2000; Saunders, 2002; Seo and Cho, 2003; Saunders, 2006) when simulating network defence also demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of simulation for validating models. Therefore, this research adopts a simulation approach to validate the rationality of the LDM. Section 5 will discuss the details of the simulation.
There are also many possible ways to test the model usability (Balci, 1994; Schipper and Joosten, 1996; Carson, 2002; Sargent, 2003) . This research focuses on a case study that applies the LDM to a real-world e-commerce business case to illustrate how to use the model. Section 6 will discuss the detail of the case study.
Description of the Layered Decision Model (LDM)
The LDM (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006 ) includes three decision layers. Security policies are defined at Layer Zero, defence strategies at Layer One, and real-time defence tactics at Layer Two. The layers are used to define the decision parameters, establish relationships between decision types, and support and record decisions made.
Other model components -used variously as inputs or as 'internal states' needed to make a decision -include risk assessment for known threat profiles and estimation of costs associated with each threat and related defence mechanisms. The cost-benefit analysis is based on ROI analysis, which compares and selects the most cost-effective defence.
Security policies, defence strategies, and real-time defence tactics vary with business types and times. To formally describe the LDM, we consider a particular business type at a particular time, and make the following definitions:
T' = {t j , …, t M } is a set of threats. T = 〈t 1 , …, t M 〉 is an ordered set of threats after ranking based on expected cost.
The flow through the model's architecture is shown in Figure 1 . Specific security policies, defence strategies, and defence tactics are determined as the model is used -they are not embedded in the structure of the model itself. So, for example, a security manager might combine both business goals and personal experience when determining the specific policies to be set within Layer Zero.
By connecting decisions in this way, we achieve several advantages. First, we provide a way to organise the making of decisions. Second, we establish explicit connectivity between decisions of different types. This shows how decisions made in one layer might impact decisions in another layer. For example, if a tactic in Layer Two is changed so that it no longer fulfils the strategy in Layer One, a gap appears in the model. Third, we set the basis for performing an integrated cost assessment at multiple levels of decision-making. We allow for iterations between and among levels. This iteration facilitates decisions about defence tactics and defence strategies within the context of business goals. Additionally, the iterations allow decisions to be made about which business goals are reasonable in light of the associated costs.
As depicted in Figure 1 , the inputs to Layer Zero are the business goals and threat environment based on risk assessment. The outputs are security policies (which embody the business goals) and ranked threats (based on the priorities of the business). Layer Zero considers the set of all decisions regarding what a business ought to be doing.
At Layer Zero, cost modelling is applied to assess the business costs of SLE and ALE for each threat type. By calculating the ALE of all threats, the threats can be ranked accordingly. The higher the ALE, the more critical the threat is. Layer One addresses defence strategies as selected within the context of predetermined business goals addressed in Layer Zero. Decisions are made in Layer One to determine a set of defence strategies that will achieve the needs of the security policies established in Layer Zero. There can be many possible strategies that would be sufficient -but which one is the best for a particular organisation? In our model, defence strategies are selected both on the basis of Layer Zero decisions about business goals and on the specific defensive strategies that are available in Layer One. Budgets and business values, such as moral imperatives to use/not use certain defence techniques, are taken into account. Identifying multiple strategies for comparison also takes into consideration the implementation cost of Layer Two. Important principles for designing defence strategies include breadth-of-coverage and defence-in-depth (Butler, 2002) . Breadth-of-coverage principle requires that a defence strategy covers all threats and that each threat has at least one defence technique to cover it. Defence-in-depth principle requires that a defence strategy covers multiple defence purposes, which include prevention, protection, and recovery.
To complete the creation of Layer One, business cost modelling and cost-benefit analyses are applied to assess each strategy's cost and benefit. Then each strategy is ranked based on its cost-effectiveness, such as ROI. Other methods of ranking are also possible. Layer One considers the set of all decisions regarding the defence approach a business ought to use to achieve its security requirements and business goals.
Layer Two decisions involve choosing specific defence tactics. The inputs to Layer Two are the defence strategies provided by Layer One (as well as the associated ranked threats). Thus, there will be 'multiple' instances of Layer Two decisions, which means a defence tactic may be used by more than one defence strategy, and a defence strategy may have more than one defence tactic to counter a specific threat. By using the LDM, the decision graph of a specific business case would show the explicit connections between defence tactics and defence strategies. When making Layer Two decisions in our model, the cost modelling and cost-benefit analyses are applied to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of various defence tactics when countering each specific threat. This makes it easy to select the most cost-effective tactic for each threat.
Layer Two also compares the damage cost, SLE, of each threat and the related response and operational costs when taking specific responsive action. This comparison of threat and response helps determine whether the threat is worth mitigating. Layer Two considers the set of all decisions regarding the defence technique a business ought to use to fulfil its strategies.
Layer Two gives feedback to Layer One about the effectiveness of each defence tactic when mitigating specific threats. This feedback helps refine each Layer One defence strategy in regard to cost-effective mitigation of all threats to business goals. The refinement might include reducing or adding certain techniques to lessen specific threats cost effectively.
Layer Two also gives feedback to Layer Zero to assist in determining if specific threats are worth mitigating. This will help Layer Zero refine the security policy set and the threat set, which might include re-ranking the threats.
The decision-making process is not a one-time effort. It requires multiple iterations to refine the decision parameters in order to find the cost-effective solutions at all three decision layers. Figure 2 shows an example of hierarchical relationships among three decision layers. This research adopts a simulation approach, based on the face validity technique, to test LDM rationality, and conducts a case study to demonstrate how to use the LDM in real-world business cases. This section presents a formalisation of the LDM decision process and defines the model rationality, which includes model consistency, no BEP, and model optimality. The simulation system is developed in Prolong based on this formalisation. Execution of the simulation system allows us to automatically check whether the LDM meets the requirements of rationality. Section 5 will explain the simulation system. Section 6 will discuss the details of the case study.
Decision graph and decision process
The decision making process in the LDM can be described as a decision graph with start and end points. The use of the LDM can help select the best defence for a given threat from a set of defences with different cost-effectiveness. This decision process should be consistent and rational.
Definition 1: A Decision Process (DP) corresponds to a Directed Graph (DG) which is composed of a set of sub-directed graphs:
Each sub-directed graph SDG i represents an execution path of a layered decision making process that goes through the defence strategy S i ∈ S, and includes the vertices and arcs in the dotted area as shown in Figure 3 . 
denotes the set of arcs between decision types X and Y in SDG i , V i denotes the total vertices in SDG i , and ROI i denotes the maximum cost-benefit of the defence plans. Then we have
Thus, an SDG i is defined as follows:
Model rationality
With regard to LDM rationality, we focus on three properties: consistency, no BEP and optimality (in terms of the most cost-effective solutions 
We use S i A + T to indicate that S i is a consistent strategy with regard to the threat set T. Let Θ(S i A + T) denote that S i is the most cost-effective and consistent strategy to T, that is, S i satisfies the following:
We use r A + t to indicate that r is a consistent tactic with regard to the threat t. Let Θ(r A + t) denote that r is the most cost-effective and consistent action to t, that is, r satisfies the following:
Let s(DP) indicate a set of recommendations regarding defence strategies produced by a decision process DP in the LDM. Let ℜ(DP) indicate a set of recommendations regarding defence tactics produced by a decision process DP in the LDM.
Definition 3: Free of Blocked Execution Paths (BEP).
A Decision Process (DP) in the LDM is free of BEP, denoted as DP ∼BEP , if and only if the DP is consistent and
Thus, the model's rationality can be defined as follows.
Definition 4: Rationality. A Decision Process (DP) in the LDM is rational if and only if the DP is consistent, no BEP, and its recommendations yield the best cost-effective actions in terms of ROI:
In order to test whether the LDM decision process meets the requirement of rationality (Definition 4.5), we need to explore all SDG i (s) of a decision process, and test if each SDG i meets the requirements of model consistency, no BEP, and optimality. Figure 4 is the flowchart for the simulation process for testing the decision process rationality. 
Simulation environment
The purpose of developing a simulation system is two-fold:
• to demonstrate how the LDM can be applied in the decision making process for cost-effective network defence, through exploring the hierarchical relationships among threats, security policies, defence strategies, and defence tactics
• validate the rationality properties for the model.
Structure of the simulation software
We developed a Prolong based simulation to capture the essence of the LDM and to validate its properties. The simulation ranks the threats, and determines security policies, cost-effective defence strategies, and defence tactics, based on input threat profiles and available defence mechanisms. Figure 5 depicts an overview of the simulation architecture.
The input to the simulation includes a set of threats and corresponding annual frequencies, the basic cost variables associated with defence mechanisms, the defence mechanisms and their effectiveness, and the security policies, defence strategies and defence tactics, as well as the relationships between the threats, security policies, defence strategies, and defence tactics.
Input variables may pose a number of challenging tasks for business impact and ROI analysis due to the uncertainties, changeability, and variability of input variables. These tasks include estimating cost values and effectiveness of specific defence mechanisms when countering specific threats, in addition to projecting an annual attack frequency of all threats. Researchers have worked to develop ways to capture uncertainties and the variability of input variables (Conrad, 2005; Locher, 2005 ). Conrad's (2005) research and Locher's (2005) research on risk assessment and security investment used probabilistic methods (Monte-Carlo methods), which defined probability distributions for attack frequency. For example, the annual attack frequency can be assumed as a Poisson distribution (Conrad, 2005) . In our simulation, we use the average values for the input variables. However, significant work remains, particularly in the area of annual attack frequency, since knowledge of existing defences and emergence of new attack techniques will certainly have an effect on the number of attacks. Such study is beyond the scope of this paper.
We use a set of expert-identified facts to represent threat profiles, security policies, available defence mechanisms, and estimation of cost and effectiveness. In addition, a set of Prolong rules is defined to search for defence strategies, defence tactics, and calculate their cost-effectiveness (ROI).
Prolong facts and rules
In the simulation, the following Prolong facts and rules are defined:
• Annual frequency of threats. The estimated annual frequency for each threat is defined as frequency(Threat, F).
• Single loss expectancy. The cost of damage or the SLE for each threat is defined as sle(Threat, SLE). This is the post-occurrence cost that includes labour cost, material cost, data loss, idle pay and business disruption. ALE for each threat can be obtained by multiplying the SLE of the threat with its annual frequency.
• Cost of defence mechanisms. The investment cost for each defence strategy is defined as cost_s(Strategy, Cost). This is a pre-occurrence cost that includes: material cost, labour cost, maintenance cost, and training cost. The investment cost for each defence tactic is defined as cost_t(Tactic, Threat, Cost). This is also a pre-occurrence cost that includes: operation cost and response cost (The unit of cost is up to the users. We assume US dollars in this work).
• Effectiveness of defence mechanism. The estimated effectiveness of each defence strategy when countering each threat is defined as effect_s(Threat, Strategy, E). Similarly, the estimated effectiveness of each defence tactic when countering each threat is defined as effect_t(Threat, Tactic, E).
• Mappings between layers. Several mappings are defined here:
• threat_policy(Threat,Policy) defines the relationships from threats to security policies (which Threat is covered by what security Policy.) Each threat is covered by at least one security policy, and all threats must be covered.
• policy_strategy(Policy,Strategy) indicates the mappings from a security policy to a defence strategy (which Strategy fulfills what Policy.
• strategy_tactic(Strategy,Tactic) indicates the mappings from defence strategies to defence tactics (which defence Strategy determines what defence Tactic.
• enforce_PST(Pol, Stra, Tac) is used to enforce the consistency among security policies, defence strategies and defence tactics (Tac ⊵ Stra ⊵ Pol).
• Cost-benefit analysis. ROI is the driving force behind the cost-benefit analysis to enforce the model rationality of the LDM. The canonical definition of ROI is (benefits -costs)/costs. In this paper, we define ROI for a defence mechanism (a strategy or a tactic) as the net cost saving or money not lost from threats divided by the investment cost of the defence mechanism. This net cost saving (or money not lost from threats) can be considered the net benefit or investment return of an installed security defence mechanism. In other words, the value is in costs that will not be incurred, rather than revenue that will be produced. Thus,
ROI(S) = [(∑ALE(t) × effect(t, S)) -cost(S)]/cost(S) (5.1)
where the summation ranges over t ∈ T and S is a defence strategy. The ROI can be defined similarly for defence tactics. The cost-effective analysis is based on our earlier work (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Ales-Foss, 2006) .
Case study
To demonstrate how the LDM can be used in real-world business cases, we applied the LDM to a real estate Web service company. The reason for choosing this company was that it conducted typical e-commerce business, and not only handled customers' critical personal data, but also processed their critical financial information. Therefore, network security was very critical to the success of this company.
In the beginning of 2005, this real estate Web service company experienced a series of costly network outages caused by external and internal security violations. Prior to that time, the company was not aware of a security problem and had not conducted a risk assessment. The company decided to deploy more sophisticated security measures. However, they had limited knowledge and a limited budget. We decided to apply the LDM concept to the security architectural design in this e-commerce business case.
Before applying the LDM, we first ran the simulation software to check the rationality of the LDM decision process based on the input obtained from interviews with security managers at the real-estate Web service company. We fixed the logic errors, inconsistency, and object mismatches of the decision process. Then, we applied the LDM to the design of cost-effective network defence for this business case. This case study provided a concrete example of how to use the LDM. The following sections describe the details of the case study.
Overview of the business case

Business goals
This company helped real estate agents and loan officers by providing online, Web-based services, which included Web page management, user membership and fee payment processing, client application handling, property searching, and loan application processing. The company's goal was to protect the confidentiality and integrity of customer data. The data included customers' personal information, SSNs, bank account numbers, and credit card numbers. The company's services had to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week so that the clients could search properties and select a loan program in a quick and reliable way regardless of the day or time. The objective of the network security was to protect the business goals listed in Table 1 .
Based on the above business goals and security requirements, the management needed to identify threats and determine proper security policies, defence strategies, and defence tactics. The customer data and system files should not be modified by unauthorised people and processes g 3 Availability To ensure the e-commerce service availability (24x7), the Denial Of Service (DOS) attack must be prevented. Once it happens, it must be mitigated promptly and effectively
System architecture
The network system included a Web server, database server and e-mail server. The system had basic security features -a firewall outside the gateway, a network monitor tool to track user activities, and a virus scanner that filtered viruses and worms.
Participants
The system administrators who took care of the daily Information Technology (IT) support and maintenance for the whole company also worked as security managers. They did not have much experience in risk assessment, security policy establishment, or technique implementation.
Applying the LDM to the design of security architecture
Threat identification and business impact analysis
Having defined the business goals, G = {g 1 , g 2 , g 3 }, the company needed to identify threats (T) and rank them (T). Threats can be both internal and external. Internal threats include employee behaviour. Employees could attempt to access data that they are not authorised to see or misuse the computers by accident or because of lack of experience. Also, employees could inadvertently download viruses and worms from websites or via e-mail. Any of these factors could cause service outages. External threats include attacks from hackers. Hackers might break into the server and steal confidential data, or the attackers might launch DOS attacks to take down the network. Table 2 shows the initial identified threats and their ranking as identified by the security team.
Originally, an 'unauthorised access' attack from an external party was the principal concern to this company. Therefore, security managers initially listed 'unauthorised access' as the number one threat before quantitative business costs were estimated. In addition, the security managers did not consider 'internal user misuse' a threat. After evaluating the causes of past service outages, the security managers realised employee misuse was one of the major causes of service outages.
Security managers of the real estate Web service company were obviously unaware of how critical each type of threat could be. Security managers were asked to use the LDM as a guide while conducting a detailed research assessment and business impact analysis to establish security policies, to design defence mechanisms, and to apply cost modelling and cost-benefit analysis in selecting the best defence plans. Table 2 Initial threat ranking (T′)
Threats Ranking
Unauthorized Access (UA) (t 1 ): Attacker can obtain unauthorised access by guessing user names and passwords. The attacker may obtain root access and change system files or modify trading data 1 Application Level Attack (ALA) (t 2 ): Attacker may exploit well-known weaknesses in software and the operating systems that are commonly found on servers to obtain root access After ALEs were estimated, threats were re-ranked to reflect the criticality of each threat based on the LDM criteria. Table 3 lists the refined threat ranking and ALE. The new ranking shows that 'unauthorised access' remained the number one critical threat, since it had the highest annual business loss. 'Internal user misuse' became the second highest ranked critical threat. Threats and their rankings were essential in determining security policies and cost-effective defence mechanisms in the later decision layers. Therefore, the ranked threat set T = <t 1 , t 6 , t 2, t 3 , t 5 , t 4 >. Table 4 lists the security policies established by security managers, and major threats each security policy might cover. Table 4 Security policies and coverage (continued) Enforce authentication (major threats: t 1 -t 6 )
Determination of security policies (Layer Zero)
• Defence strategy two. Table 6 lists the features of the second defence strategy (S 2 ) -the basic defence strategy. The basic defence strategy included the existing defence plan deployed based on the original budget and limited security knowledge before applying the LDM. Table 7 lists the cost data estimated by security managers based on their experience and cost modelling (Wei et al., 2005 (Wei et al., , 2007 Wei and Alves-Foss, 2006) One of the most challenging tasks for ROI analysis was estimating the effectiveness of a specific defence technique when countering a specific threat. To simplify the decision making process, we used a fixed value to represent the estimated effectiveness of each defence technique based on interviews with security managers involved in this case study. Another challenging task was estimating the annual attack frequency of each threat. We also used a fixed value derived from the best estimate of security managers to represent the annual attack frequency of each threat. Future research will focus on investigating how effectiveness range and frequency range affect the decision results. Table 8 lists the investment cost of all defence strategies, their effectiveness in countering specific threats, and the total cost-effectiveness, represented as ROI in this paper. Benefit (i, j) stands for the benefit of using strategy j when countering threat, i. The expected benefit is the total cost saving of using a strategy when countering all listed threats. From the ROI results, we see that S 1 has better cost-effectiveness than S 2.
ROI analysis
Determination of defence tactics (Layer Two)
Layer Two determines cost-effective defence tactics for each threat. The following is a set of defence tactics (R) to counter the above threats (t 1 -t 6 ): The estimated effectiveness of each defence tactic when countering specific threats and the investment cost are listed in Table 9 . We applied the relevant cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the approximate cost-effectiveness of each tactic and selected the best defence tactic for countering each threat. Table 9 lists the threats and their corresponding defence tactics, effectiveness, damage cost, response cost, operational cost and ROIs. "Terminate Session/Connection And Disable Account (TSCD)" is the best defence tactic for "internal user misuse attack", and 'Block Access (BA)' is the best defence tactic for the remaining attacks. In summary, the business case study provided a concrete example of how to apply the LDM and guide security managers in designing cost-effective network defence. We received positive responses from those who participated in this case study. 
Discussion
While there is a proliferation of modelling and simulation methodologies for decision support for system security, there is no comprehensive decision model that integrates decisions about security policies, cost-effective defence strategies, and real-time defence tactics into a single efficient decision framework. The LDM proposed in this paper overcomes this weakness and connects these three essential decision types together through the combination of risk management, cost modelling, and cost-benefit analysis. Model rationality and usability are two important characteristics of the LDM. Achieving model rationality requires the decision process to be consistent, free of BEP, and optimal. Thus, before applying the LDM technique to make decisions with respect to a particular real-world business case, we need to make sure that the specific decision process is rational by applying face validity techniques. Compared to other validation techniques, we have identified face validity as being especially useful in validating model rationality, which requires experts to evaluate if a decision process is correct and reasonable for its purpose (Balci, 1994; Kim and Fishwick, 1998; Carson, 2002; Sargent, 2003; Ning et al., 2004) . In this way, we can also address some of the uncertainties that may always surround parameter estimation. Incorporating the experts' knowledge and decision rules into a computerised simulation system supports automating the testing process and will help decision-makers cost-effectively check the model rationality (Kim and Fishwick, 1998; Ning et al., 2004) . The simulation approach also provides a way to further study the model's usability and sensitivity.
There are also many methodologies available to test the model usability (Balci, 1994; Schipper and Joosten, 1996; Carson, 2002; Sargent, 2003) . We have identified case studies as being especially useful in validating model usability, which requires security managers to apply the generic LDM framework to the design of cost-effective defences for specific business cases. Different business cases may have different business goals, security requirements, and threat environments. Although a particular business case study alone cannot fully validate the model, it should provide a solid example on how to use the LDM in real-world business cases, which also provides a general guidance to the network defence for the specific business category. In order to demonstrate if the model can be used in diverse business cases, we need to conduct more case studies in the future.
Further, the issue of accurate parameter estimation needs to be addressed. Our model approaches the issue of cost/benefit from the standpoint of average attacks. Of course, attackers do not remain static and so 'past performance' of attackers and past effectiveness of network defences cannot be expected to be accurate predictors of future performance and future effectiveness. Still, advances in defences tend to follow advances in attackers -since market pressures encourage development in areas where attackers have shown improvement. Future work needs to consider the question of when past performance (both of attackers and defences) is useful in choosing next generation defences, and when that statistic will be misleading. It may be that highly advanced or well-resourced attackers need to be considered separately from the average scenarios considered in this paper.
Conclusion and future work
To safeguard a network cost-effectively, our research has developed a uniform LDM that supports consistently connected decisions at three decision layers: Layer Zero for determining security policies, Layer One for defence strategies, and Layer Two for real-time defence tactics. In addition, our model supports an analytical framework that allows trace ability of costs between all decision layers, and conducts cost-benefit analyses for selecting the cost-effective defence plans. Furthermore, the LDM encourages an iterative, traversing decision process between and among decision layers.
To demonstrate if the LDM is rational and useful, we explored model validation techniques and adopted a simulation approach for validating the LDM rationality, as well as conducted a case study to demonstrate how to use the LDM. We also developed a simulation tool in Prolong based on the formalisation of the model and defined checking criteria of model rationality. Before applying the LDM to a real-world business case, security managers can iteratively refine an initial decision model into a rational one through executing the simulation tool for checking and fixing the logic errors of a decision process, including decision process inconsistency, inability to estimate costs and benefits, and the presence of BEP. The case study applied the LDM to the design of cost-effective network defence for a real-world e-commerce business, which provided a concrete example of how to use the model. In addition to refining the LDM, conducting more case studies and simulation cases, future work includes incorporating the probabilistic method into the simulation system so as to further study how the uncertainty and variability of input variables affect the decision results and the model's sensitivity.
